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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
FORT WAYNE DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
BRADLEY M. COX

)
)
)
)
)

Cause No. 1:18-CR-83-HAB

OPINION AND ORDER
If anyone needed more motivation to get off social media, consider the instant case. In
spring 2018, the FBI was asked to begin an investigation into online extortion of sexual material.
They traced the activity to Defendant’s employer, where they discovered a virtual private network
known to have been involved in the scheme on Defendant’s work computer. Agents then
questioned Defendant at his home, where he admitted to using multiple Facebook accounts to
solicit child pornography and extort sexual material from victims.
Following up on Defendant’s confession, the Government sought and obtained a subpoena
pursuant to the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (the “SCA”), directed to
Facebook. Through the subpoena, the Government obtained registration information, billing
records, records of session times and durations, and IP addresses and cookies linked to the accounts
used by Defendant (collectively the “Records”). The Government did not obtain the content of any
of the accounts.
Defendant now challenges the Government’s acquisition of the Records as a warrantless
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. According to Defendant, the Supreme Court’s
decision in Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), created an exception to the thirdparty doctrine that protects the Records from being obtained without a warrant. Defendant is not
the first person to make this argument. Instead, this same argument has been made by multiple

USDC IN/ND case 1:18-cr-00083-HAB-SLC document 140 filed 06/03/20 page 2 of 9

defendants across the country. To date, no court has accepted the argument, and that streak will
not end today.
A.

Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment generally requires that the government obtain a warrant based on

probable cause before conducting a search. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (“[U]nder the Fourth Amendment, warrants are the general rule.”). For an
“intrusion into [the] private sphere” to constitute a “search,” a defendant must “seek[] to preserve
something as private,” and “society [must be] prepared to recognize [that privacy expectation] as
reasonable.” Carpenter 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)).
Because an individual must seek to preserve something as private before a search can be
said to have occurred, information shared with third parties is generally not protected. This is called
the third party doctrine. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44 (noting that the Supreme Court has
“consistently ... held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he
voluntarily turns over to third parties”) Pursuant to that doctrine, the Supreme Court has separately
held that the government need not secure a warrant to obtain recordings of voluntary conversations
surreptitiously captured via radio transmitter, see United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752-53
(1971), records from banks, see United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976), and certain
phone call data from pen registers, see Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46, because the information at issue
in each instance had been voluntarily disclosed by the defendant to a third party, see id. at 743-44.
Defendant does not dispute that he voluntarily disclosed to Facebook (either directly or
through associated third-party websites or apps) the information contained in the Records that he
now seeks to suppress. He contends, however, that the Supreme Court's decision in Carpenter
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shows that the third-party doctrine does not apply to the information at issue here and thus that the
government needed a warrant to acquire that information.
In Carpenter, the defendant challenged on Fourth Amendment grounds the government's
warrantless acquisition -- pursuant to the SCA -- of his cell-site location information (“CSLI”)
from his wireless telecommunications carrier. 138 S.Ct. at 2211-12. The CSLI data acquired in
Carpenter depicted the defendant's movements across nearly 13,000 specific location points during
a 127-day span. Id. at 2212.
The government, in response, invoked the third-party doctrine to justify its warrantless
acquisition of the CSLI from the carrier. Id. at 2219. The Supreme Court held, however, that the
government’s acquisition of the CSLI from the carrier constituted a search, for which the
government needed a warrant, because Carpenter retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the CSLI at issue even though he had shared it with his wireless carrier. Id. at 2217-20.
Carpenter explained that, given the location information that CSLI conveyed and the fact
that a cell phone user transmits it simply by possessing the cell phone, if the government could
access the CSLI that it had acquired without a warrant in that case, then the result would be that
“[o]nly the few without cell phones could escape” what would amount to “tireless and absolute
surveillance.” Id. at 2218. Carpenter thus declined to extend the third-party doctrine to the CSLI
at issue in that case and instead determined that Carpenter did have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the CSLI that he sought to suppress. Id. at 2219-20.
Defendant contends that the Records the government acquired from Facebook without a
warrant are not materially different from the CSLI that was at issue in Carpenter. He notes in this
regard that this information enabled the Government to determine his precise location when he
logged on to Facebook and associated apps, as well as the date and time of those digital
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transmissions. For that reason, he contends, Carpenter establishes that the Government needed a
warrant to acquire the information from Facebook that he seeks to suppress, because “[a]ll of the
relevant factors which make CSLI overly intrusive apply to the location information kept by
Facebook, Inc.” (ECF No. 133 at 6).
Reasonable minds can debate whether, as a society, we want entities such as Facebook to
log the kind of information contained in the Records. But what cannot be debated is that Facebook
has this information only by virtue of individuals making an affirmative choice to provide it.
Decisions post-Carpenter have noted the volitional aspect of IP address collection as a key point
of distinction from CSLI. See, e.g., United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 97, 92 (1st Cir. 2019) (“an
internet user generates the IP address data that the government acquired from Kik in this case only
by making the affirmative decision to access a website or application. By contrast, as the Supreme
Court noted in Carpenter, every time a cell phone receives a call, text message, or email, the cell
phone pings CSLI to the nearest cell site tower without the cell phone user lifting a finger.”); see
also United States v. Caira, 833 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2016) (“the government only received
record of the I.P. addresses Caira used to log in to his Hotmail account. . . . On days when he did
not log in, the government had no idea where he was.”). Defendant’s own filings demonstrate this
point: Defendant identifies several instances where Facebook logs a user’s IP address, including
“changing account information to sending attachments in private messages to uploading photos to
the profile,” amongst other “events [that] occur during the normal course of using Facebook as
intended.” (ECF No. 133 at 5). All these events require affirmative action by the user. Indeed,
Defendant has not identified a single instance where Facebook creates an IP log without user
action. Defendant is correct that the Records contain potentially personal information about his
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life, but they contain no more than he chose to provide.1 This fact, in and of itself, takes the Records
outside of the scope of Carpenter. See, e.g., United States v. Kidd, 349 F.Supp.3d 357, 366
(S.D.N.Y. 2019) (holding that defendant needed to establish that his cell phone: “(1) passively
generates IP address information for Pinger to collect in a way similar to CSLI; or (2) consistently
conveys granular location information.”).
Defendant also overstates the precision of the information gathered from the Records.
Defendant’s characterization of the Records as providing his “exact location” is, as the Seventh
Circuit has recognized, an “unhelpful exaggeration.” Id. at 808. Rather, “the IP address data that
the government acquired from [Facebook] does not itself convey any location information. The IP
address data is merely a string of numbers associated with a device that had, at one time, accessed
a wireless network.” Hood, 920 F.3d at 92. As the Government correctly notes, that string of
numbers means nothing without additional investigation, including but not limited to gathering
specific user and location information from an internet service provider. (ECF No. 137 at 11, n.
5). While this fact is not necessarily determinative, see Kidd, 394 F.Supp.3d at 365–66, it does
weigh against finding that the Records act as a tracking device.
The legal issues aside, Defendant’s motion fails for a more fundamental reason. All the
information contained in Defendant’s filings regarding the Records, their contents, and the ability
of the Government to use the Records for tracking purposes comes solely from Defendant.
Throughout his filings, Defendant makes hyperbolic statements like the Records reveal his “exact
location” (ECF No. 133 at 5); that they create “a detailed chronicle of [his] physical presence” (Id.

1
Defendant argues that the fact that “devices will remain logged in to Facebook” undermines the argument that
information is knowingly submitted by the user. (ECF No. 133 at 6). The Court cannot agree (since the IP logs appear
to only be created through user activity), but even if it did the argument ignores the fact that leaving Facebook logged
on is itself a decision. There is nothing that stops a user from logging out of Facebook or an associated app when they
are finished using it. That they choose not to out of convenience, laziness, or any other motivation does not change
the volitional nature of the information transfer.
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at 6); that they provide “an intimate window into a person’s life” (Id.); that the Records are
“distinctly more comprehensive than the typical IP logs” (ECF No. 138 at 5); and that the cookie
data is like “the names and account numbers of every person who used a particular ATM” (Id. at
9). However, Defendant has no expert to opine on the extent of the Records, nor does he provide
any other admissible evidence regarding their nature or potential use. The Court has not even been
provided with the Records or any part thereof. Since Defendant has the burden of establishing his
reasonable expectation of privacy, see Kidd, 394 F.Supp.3d 357 at 366, this lack of evidence is
fatal to the motion.
Moreover, Defendant consistently undermines any credibility his pronouncements might
have. Defendant compares the Records to CSLI data throughout his filings but admits in his reply
that he has “never seen CSLI data.” (ECF No. 138). Defendant argues that Facebook is ubiquitous
but admits that he had done no research on the breadth of Facebook usage and further admits that
his representations in this regard are a “guess.” (ECF No. 133 at 2–3). Defendant portrays the
information gathered by Facebook as being significantly more intrusive than other companies, but
ultimately is forced to admit simply that he knows of no other company that records and reports
such data. (ECF No. 138 at 8). The Court would not be inclined to take a party’s word for any
determinative proposition and is much less inclined to do so when the party has made clear that
his word is based on little more than guess and speculation.
And even if Defendant’s hyperbole was accurate generally, he makes no attempt to
demonstrate that it is accurate with respect to this case. Take, for instance, Defendant’s assertion
that the cookie data can reveal the online activity of third parties. (Id. at 9). Did that happen in this
case? The Court has reviewed the filings of both Defendant and the Government and finds no
evidence that it did. Perhaps more to the point, Defendant has not so much as designated a single
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instance where the Government was able to determine his location from the Records. This Court’s
Fourth Amendment analysis is not driven by what might be possible or what could have happened.
Instead, this Court must undertake a “fact-specific inquiry.” United States v. Burnside, 588 F.3d
511, 517 (7th Cir. 2009). Defendant has told the Court nothing about the evidence adduced from
the Records, giving the Court no ability to meaningfully analyze whether that evidence should be
stricken.
The evolution of technology may one day change the analysis on this issue. Carpenter was
not decided until 2018, nearly two decades after cell phones had achieved widespread adoption.
We may one day wake up and find that Facebook or some other social network has become as
indispensable as the cell phone and determine, as a society, that the information collected is
deserving of constitutional protection. But that day is not today, and this case is not that case. On
the basis of the record before the Court, the Records “fall[] comfortably within the scope of the
third-party doctrine” which continues, even after Carpenter, to apply to “business records that
might incidentally reveal location information.” United States v. Contreras, 905 F.3d 853, 857
(5th Cir. 2018). As such, Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the Records, and
no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.
B.

Good Faith
Even if the Court were to rule differently on the Fourth Amendment issue, it would still be

compelled to deny Defendant’s motion. The exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment is “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
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The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police
have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived
the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of
such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers, or
in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused.
Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the
deterrence rationale loses much of its force.
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974). Accordingly, where the illegal seizure is the result
of “objectively reasonable law enforcement activity,” the exclusionary rule does not apply. Leon,
468 U.S. at 919. Objectively reasonable law enforcement activity has been found both where
officers rely on a search warrant, Leon, 468 U.S. at 920–21, and where they rely on a statute that
is later declared unconstitutional, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352 (1987).
That Carpenter did not invalidate the SCA in its entirety does not meaningfully distinguish
this case from Krull. What matters is whether the Government could reasonably rely on the SCA
at the time the subpoena was issued to Facebook. Defendant argues that it could not, pointing to
language at the end of the Sixth Circuit’s ruling on remand in Carpenter. There, that court held,
“[m]oving forward, traditional Fourth Amendment principles will replace reflexive or mechanical
use of § 2703(d). The government must either get a warrant or rely on a recognized exception to
the warrant requirement.” United States v. Carpenter, 926 F.3d 313, 318 (6th Cir. 2019).
Read out of context, this passage seems to suggest that all requests under the SCA require
either a warrant or a recognized exception. This would support Defendant’s arguments. But read
in context, it is clear that the Sixth Circuit limited its holding to CSLI. This is true not only because
CSLI was the sole issue before the court, but also because CSLI is explicitly referenced in the
sentence immediately preceding Defendant’s chosen excerpt. Carpenter, supra (“Carpenter II
confirmed that the SCA does not immunize a government officer’s collection of CSLI from the
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safeguards of the Fourth Amendment.”). The Court finds nothing in the Sixth Circuit’s holding
that would have put the Government on notice that a warrant was required to obtain the Records.
The insurmountable obstacle for Defendant is the unanimity of case law that holds contrary
to his suppression argument. “Evidence obtained during a search conducted in reasonable reliance
on binding precedent is not subject to the exclusionary rule.” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229,
241 (2011). As the Government points out, every federal appellate and trial court, including the
Seventh Circuit, that has ruled on the question of whether individuals have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in IP logs has answered in the negative. (See ECF No. 137 at 12–13)
(collecting cases). Absent any authority to the contrary, the Government was entitled to rely on
those precedents, both binding and persuasive. Therefore, even if the Government conducted a
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment when it obtained the Records, the Court concludes
that it acted in good faith.
C. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Suppress (ECF No. 133) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED on June 3, 2020.
s/ Holly A. Brady
JUDGE HOLLY A. BRADY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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